Ballistic Missiles
Iran operates the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East — precision-guided, solid and liquid-fuelled systems designed to defeat multi-layered air defences through speed, volume, and terminal manoeuvrability.
Iran operates the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East, with a stockpile estimated at over 3,000 missiles across multiple system types. The programme dates to the 1980s and has evolved from early Scud derivatives into indigenously developed precision-guided and hypersonic systems. Iran's ballistic missiles are its primary long-range strike capability against Israel, capable of reaching any point in the country from launch sites inside Iran.
The arsenal emphasises range, warhead mass, and — increasingly — terminal manoeuvrability to defeat interceptor missiles. Newer systems such as the Kheibar Shekan and Fattah-1 represent deliberate attempts to defeat Israel's multi-layered missile defence architecture through speed, trajectory shaping, and manoeuvring re-entry vehicles.
The programme is indigenously controlled by the IRGC Aerospace Force, though its technological lineage draws substantially on North Korean Nodong missile technology (itself derived from Soviet R-17 Scud), with additional assistance historically attributed to Chinese and Russian technical expertise in propellant chemistry, airframe engineering, and guidance systems. Iran now produces all major components domestically.
Side-view animation showing the ballistic arc from western Iran (~1,000 km) to Israel. Standard BMs exit the atmosphere above the Karman Line (100 km) at apogee ~250 km; the Fattah-1 HGV follows a depressed trajectory staying within the upper atmosphere and manoeuvring during glide. Altitude markers and atmosphere layers to scale.
Six primary systems form Iran's operational ballistic missile inventory capable of reaching Israel. Click any system name to jump to the detailed profile below.
| System | Type | Propulsion | Range | Warhead | Speed | Navigation / Guidance | Year | Est. Inventory | Key Suppliers / Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Emad | MRBM | Liquid-fuel | ~1,700 km | ~750 kg | Mach 8-10 | INS + terminal optical/radar seeker (maneuverable RV) | 2015 | 100-200 | Indigenous; Shahab-3/Nodong lineage (DPRK); components historically from China, DPRK |
| Ghadr | MRBM | Liquid-fuel | ~1,950 km | ~750 kg | Mach 8-10 | INS + possible terminal correction | 2007 | 100-200 | Indigenous; Shahab-3 derivative (DPRK Nodong); aluminium airframe technology |
| Sejjil | MRBM | Solid-fuel (2-stage) | ~2,000 km | ~650 kg | Mach 10-12 | INS only (no confirmed terminal guidance) | 2008 / op. ~2011 | 50-100 | Indigenous solid-fuel; propellant chemistry possibly aided by Chinese technical assistance |
| Kheibar Shekan | MRBM | Solid-fuel | ~1,450 km | ~500 kg | Mach 8-10 | INS + terminal maneuvering (radar or EO seeker) | 2022 (unveiled) | 50-100 | Fully indigenous; represents Iran's mature solid-fuel capability |
| Fattah-1 | Hypersonic MRBM | Solid + HGV glide | ~1,400 km | ~450 kg | Mach 13-15 | INS + HGV terminal maneuvering (claimed) | 2023 (unveiled) | 20-50 | Indigenous; HGV technology draws on published Chinese/Russian research |
| Khorramshahr-4 | MRBM | Liquid-fuel | ~2,000 km | ~1,500 kg | Mach 8-10 | INS + terminal guidance (type unconfirmed); MIRV-capable (claimed) | 2023 (as Khorramshahr-4) | 30-60 | Based on BM-25 Musudan / Soviet R-27 lineage (DPRK); heavily modified indigenous design |
Inventory estimates are based on open-source assessments and should be treated as approximations. Range figures are for maximum-range configurations; combat trajectories may differ. Data current as of March 2026.
The evolution of Iranian ballistic missile guidance represents a generational leap in capability. First-generation systems relied entirely on inertial navigation, with accuracies measured in kilometres. Current systems combine inertial platforms with terminal seekers, reducing circular error probable (CEP) to tens of metres — sufficient for targeting hardened infrastructure.
- Electro-optical (EO): Camera-based scene matching against stored imagery
- Radar seeker: Active or semi-active radar for target discrimination
- Infrared (IR): Heat signature homing (limited open-source confirmation)
- GLONASS (Russian): Integration reported in some systems as a mid-course correction layer
- BeiDou (Chinese): Potential integration in newer post-2020 designs
- Indigenous augmentation: Iran has claimed development of satellite navigation ground stations to support indigenous positioning
Detailed specifications and operational context for each system in Iran's ballistic missile inventory capable of reaching Israel.
Ballistic missiles travel 8 to 15 times faster than a commercial airliner. The Fattah-1 hypersonic glide vehicle reaches speeds where conventional interception becomes extremely difficult, with a decision-to-intercept window measured in seconds. Bars scaled to Mach 15 = 100%.
Bars scaled to Mach 15 = 100%. Commercial airliner shown as baseline reference. The visible gap between the A380 and ballistic missile entries reflects a true physical discontinuity of an order of magnitude or more.
Bars animate when scrolled into view. At Mach 9-11, a ballistic missile is travelling 11-14 times faster than a commercial airliner. At Mach 15, the Fattah-1 covers 1,000 km in under four minutes — faster than any current interceptor can reposition.
The short flight time of ballistic missiles from western Iran is the defining tactical challenge for Israeli air defence. From launch detection to impact is measured in minutes, not hours. The figures below represent straight-line theoretical estimates.
Western Iran (Kermanshah region, ~1,000 km to Tel Aviv)
Central Iran (Isfahan region, ~1,500 km to Tel Aviv)
Detection lag: IR satellite systems (DSP/SBIRS) typically detect launch within 30-60 seconds; notification to Israeli command adds further seconds. Intercept decisions for Arrow-3 must be made within the first 2-3 minutes of a standard ballistic trajectory. For HGV trajectories, the engagement window is further compressed.
Cost estimates are based on open-source and analyst reporting (Arrow-2: ~$3-10M per interceptor; Kheibar Shekan BM: ~$1-3M estimated per unit). The core strategic logic: if defenders must spend more to intercept than attackers spend to fire, saturation campaigns erode interceptor magazines faster than they can be replenished.
Iran has launched ballistic missiles against Israel in all four True Promise rounds, with each round seeing an increase in volume and system diversity.
| Round | BMs Fired | Key Types Used | Notable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Round 1 April 2024 | ~120 | Emad, Ghadr | First direct Iranian ballistic missile strike on Israel; majority intercepted by Arrow-2, Arrow-3, and US/UK/Jordanian forces |
| Round 2 October 2024 | ~200 | All types incl. Fattah-1, Kheibar Shekan | Ballistic missile-only approach; some rounds penetrated defences and struck Israeli territory; first operational Fattah-1 use |
| Round 3 June 2025 | ~500+ | Mixed including Sejjil, Kheibar Shekan, Emad, Ghadr | Sustained campaign over 12 days; saturation approach designed to exhaust interceptor stocks; Sejjil confirmed in operational use |
| Round 4 February 2026 – ongoing | Ongoing | All types incl. Khorramshahr-4 | Multi-theatre targeting; Khorramshahr-4 deployed with 1,500 kg warhead class; widest system diversity of any round |
Click any system for full specifications, photos, and sources.
AI-generated content for informational purposes only. Data should be independently verified. Specifications are drawn from open-source reporting and may not reflect classified assessments. Inventory estimates are approximations based on publicly available analysis. Reference data current as of March 2026.