Houthis (Ansar Allah)
Iran-backed Yemeni militia: Red Sea operations, missile and drone capabilities, and role in the broader Iran-Israel conflict.
Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, is an Iran-backed Zaydi Shia militia that controls much of northern Yemen including the capital Sana'a. Since October 2023, the Houthis have positioned themselves as an active participant in Iran's "Axis of Resistance," launching missiles and drones at Israel and conducting a sustained anti-shipping campaign in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. While their direct contribution to the True Promise strike operations remains marginal compared to IRGC direct fires, they represent a persistent secondary front and a significant disruption to global maritime trade.
| Category | Systems | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Ballistic missiles | Toufan (Qiam variant), Hatem, Palestine-2 | Range up to ~2,000 km; capable of reaching central Israel |
| Cruise missiles | Quds-series (land-attack), anti-ship variants | Used against Red Sea shipping and Israeli targets |
| Attack drones | Samad-3, Waid (Shahed-136 variant), Jaffa | Long-range one-way attack UAVs; range 1,500+ km |
| Anti-ship missiles | Iranian-supplied C-802 variants, locally modified systems | Primary weapon in Red Sea anti-shipping campaign |
| Air defence | Assorted SAMs, MANPADS | Limited capability against US/coalition aircraft |
| Maritime | Explosive-laden USVs, naval mines | Deployed in Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb approaches |
Beginning in November 2023, the Houthis launched a sustained campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, claiming solidarity with Gaza. This campaign has continued through 2025–2026.
- Attacks using anti-ship missiles, drones, and explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels
- Targeted ships perceived as Israeli-linked, US/UK-flagged, or transiting to Israeli ports
- Forced major shipping lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10–14 days to voyages
- US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and subsequent strikes (Operation Poseidon Archer) attempted to degrade Houthi capability
- Houthis demonstrated rapid reconstitution and continued attacks despite sustained US/UK strikes on launch sites
Ballistic Missile Launches
Multiple ballistic missile launches toward Eilat and central Israel, most intercepted by Arrow or falling short. The ~2,000 km range from Yemen to Israel tests the outer envelope of these systems.
Drone Swarms
Long-range one-way attack drones (Shahed variants) launched toward Israel, typically in small numbers. Most intercepted en route by coalition assets or Israeli air defences. Flight time from Yemen is 8–12+ hours.
Coordination with IRGC
Some Houthi launches appear timed to coincide with IRGC waves, adding a southern vector that complicates Israeli air defence geometry and forces multi-axis tracking.
Limited Impact
Direct damage to Israel from Houthi strikes has been minimal to date. Their primary effect is forcing sustained alert posture and interceptor expenditure over a secondary axis.
The Houthis are a key component of Iran's "Axis of Resistance" network, though they maintain more operational autonomy than Hizbullah.
- IRGC provides ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drone kits, anti-ship weapons, and technical advisors
- Weapons smuggled via maritime routes (dhows) and overland through Oman
- Houthis retain independent decision-making on targeting and timing but align strategically with IRGC objectives
- Iran uses Houthi operations to project power without direct attribution and to open additional fronts against Israel and US assets
- Houthi propaganda closely mirrors Iranian messaging, framing attacks as resistance on behalf of Gaza and the broader Muslim world
Round 3 (TP3)
Sporadic Houthi launches toward Israel during the 12-day campaign. Contributed to multi-axis pressure but did not achieve significant penetrations. Red Sea shipping disruption continued in parallel.
Round 4 (TP4)
Houthi attacks continue alongside the ongoing IRGC campaign. Multi-theatre expansion in TP4 aligns with Houthi targeting of Gulf-based US assets. Southern vector remains active but secondary to direct Iranian fires.
AI-generated content for informational purposes only. Data should be independently verified.